{"id":4828,"date":"2024-04-13T19:42:17","date_gmt":"2024-04-14T03:42:17","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/inedc.com\/24\/?p=4828"},"modified":"2024-04-13T19:42:17","modified_gmt":"2024-04-14T03:42:17","slug":"sheetz-v-el-dorado-county-closing-the-loophole-on-governmental-overreach","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/inedc.com\/24\/government\/sheetz-v-el-dorado-county-closing-the-loophole-on-governmental-overreach\/","title":{"rendered":"Sheetz v. El Dorado County: Closing the Loophole on Governmental Overreach"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>El Dorado County (April 13, 2024) &#8211; In a landmark decision with far-reaching implications for property rights, the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously ruled in favor of George Sheetz in the case of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.inedc.com\/23\/government\/local-takings-case-goes-to-the-supreme-court-of-the-united-states\/\">Sheetz v. El Dorado County<\/a>. The ruling, delivered on April 12, 2024, signifies a critical victory for property owners nationwide and marks a significant step in curbing governmental overreach in the permitting process.<\/p>\n<p>George Sheetz, a seasoned engineering contractor and consultant based in Northern California, found himself entangled in bureaucratic red tape when he sought a building permit for a small manufactured home on a vacant lot in rural El Dorado County. What began as a quest for a peaceful retirement retreat turned into a legal battle against exorbitant permit fees that threatened to derail his plans.<\/p>\n<p>The crux of the matter lay in the county&#8217;s demand for a staggering traffic impact fee exceeding $23,000\u2014a sum that far exceeded any reasonable assessment of the project&#8217;s impact on public infrastructure. Despite lacking concrete evidence linking the fee to actual roadwork necessitated by Sheetz&#8217;s project, the county adamantly defended its imposition, citing legal obligations.<\/p>\n<p>Undeterred by the formidable financial burden, Sheetz decided to take a stand. He paid the fee under protest and subsequently initiated legal proceedings against the county, contending that the fees amounted to an unconstitutional permit condition, violating established Supreme Court precedents.<\/p>\n<p>At the heart of Sheetz&#8217;s argument lay the principles enshrined in landmark Supreme Court cases such as Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Dolan v. City of Tigard, and Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District. These precedents established that permit conditions must bear a direct relationship to the actual impacts of the proposed development, preventing governmental bodies from engaging in what the Court termed &#8220;out-and-out extortion.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>However, a legal loophole had allowed some lower courts to sidestep these constitutional safeguards, particularly when permit conditions were imposed legislatively rather than administratively. This critical distinction had enabled El Dorado County to justify its excessive fees as part of a countywide land use overhaul enacted in 2004.<\/p>\n<p>Sheetz&#8217;s case, championed by former Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) attorney Paul Beard II, now of Pierson Ferdinand, sought to challenge this loophole and reaffirm the fundamental protections afforded by the Takings Clause of the Constitution. Beard, leveraging his expertise honed in previous victories such as Koontz, argued Sheetz&#8217;s case before the Supreme Court, with PLF attorneys serving as co-counsel.<\/p>\n<p>In delivering the Court&#8217;s unanimous decision, Justice Amy Coney Barrett underscored the equal application of property rights protections, whether infringed upon by legislators or administrators. The ruling unequivocally declares that the Takings Clause prohibits both branches of government from imposing unconstitutional conditions on land-use permits, closing a significant loophole that had long been exploited by governmental entities.<\/p>\n<p>The significance of <a href=\"http:\/\/www.inedc.com\/23\/government\/supreme-court-to-scrutinize-unlawful-permit-conditions-in-landmark-case\/\">Sheetz v. El Dorado County<\/a> extends beyond its immediate implications for Sheetz and his fellow property owners. It serves as a powerful reaffirmation of the principle that property rights are sacrosanct and immune to arbitrary governmental encroachments, ensuring that the promise of individual liberty enshrined in the Constitution remains steadfast in the face of bureaucratic overreach.<\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<h2 style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">&#8212; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074\">Detailed Analysis by Cornell Law School<\/a> &#8212;<\/h2>\n<h1 id=\"page_title\" class=\"title\">SHEETZ v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO<\/h1>\n<div class=\"tabbable-panel\">\n<div class=\"tabbable-line\">\n<ul class=\"nav nav-tabs \">\n<li class=\"active\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#tab_default_1\" data-toggle=\"tab\">Supreme Court<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div class=\"tab-content\">\n<div id=\"tab_default_1\" class=\"tab-pane active\">\n<div>\n<div class=\"syllabus\">\n<hr \/>\n<h2 id=\"writing-ZS\">Syllabus<\/h2>\n<p class=\"toccaption\">SHEETZ v. COUNTY OF EL DORADO<br \/>\n84 Cal. App. 5th 394, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, vacated and remanded.<\/p>\n<ul class=\"writingtoc\">\n<li><span class=\"writnav\"><strong>Syllabus<\/strong>\u00a0<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#writing-22-1074_SYLLABUS\"><span class=\"writnav\">[Syllabus]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supct\/pdf\/22-1074.pdf\" aria-label=\"[Pdf]\"><span class=\"writnav\">[PDF]<\/span><\/a><\/li>\n<li><span class=\"writnav\"><strong>Opinion<\/strong>, Barrett\u00a0<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#writing-22-1074_OPINION_4\"><span class=\"writnav\">[Barrett Opinion]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supct\/pdf\/22-1074.pdf\" aria-label=\"[Pdf]\"><span class=\"writnav\">[PDF]<\/span><\/a><\/li>\n<li><span class=\"writnav\"><strong>Concurrence<\/strong>, Sotomayor\u00a0<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#writing-22-1074_CONCUR_5\"><span class=\"writnav\">[Sotomayor Concurrence]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supct\/pdf\/22-1074.pdf\" aria-label=\"[Pdf]\"><span class=\"writnav\">[PDF]<\/span><\/a><\/li>\n<li><span class=\"writnav\"><strong>Concurrence<\/strong>, Gorsuch\u00a0<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#writing-22-1074_CONCUR_6\"><span class=\"writnav\">[Gorsuch Concurrence]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supct\/pdf\/22-1074.pdf\" aria-label=\"[Pdf]\"><span class=\"writnav\">[PDF]<\/span><\/a><\/li>\n<li><span class=\"writnav\"><strong>Concurrence<\/strong>, Kavanaugh\u00a0<\/span><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#writing-22-1074_CONCUR_7\"><span class=\"writnav\">[Kavanaugh Concurrence]<\/span><\/a>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supct\/pdf\/22-1074.pdf\" aria-label=\"[Pdf]\"><span class=\"writnav\">[PDF]<\/span><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div id=\"writing-22-1074_SYLLABUS\" class=\"bodytext\">\n<p class=\"notice jy-both\">NOTE:\u2002Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.\u00a0The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.\u00a0See\u00a0<em>United States<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>Detroit Timber &amp; Lumber Co.,<\/em>\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/200\/321\" aria-label=\"200 U. S. 321\">200 U.\u00a0S. 321<\/a>, 337.<\/p>\n<p class=\"scusnameplate jy-center\">SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/p>\n<p class=\"normal jy-both forcejy-center\">Syllabus<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-a jy-center\">SHEETZ\u00a0<em>v<\/em>. COUNTY OF EL DORADO, CALIFORNIA<\/p>\n<h4 class=\"sylct-b sc-1 jy-center\">certiorari to the court of appeal of california, third appellate district<\/h4>\n<hr \/>\n<div class=\"opiniondates\">No. 22\u20131074.\u2003Argued January 9, 2024\u2014Decided April 12, 2024<\/div>\n<hr \/>\n<p class=\"sylct-d jy-both\">As a condition of receiving a residential building permit, petitioner George Sheetz was required by the County of El Dorado to pay a $23,420 traffic impact fee. The fee was part of a \u201cGeneral Plan\u201d enacted by the County\u2019s Board of Supervisors to address increasing demand for public services spurred by new development. The fee amount was not based on the costs of traffic impacts specifically attributable to Sheetz\u2019s particular project, but rather was assessed according to a rate schedule that took into account the type of development and its location within the County. Sheetz paid the fee under protest and obtained the permit. He later sought relief in state court, claiming that conditioning the building permit on the payment of a traffic impact fee constituted an unlawful \u201cexaction\u201d of money in violation of the Takings Clause. In Sheetz\u2019s view, the Court\u2019s decisions in\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>California Coastal Comm\u2019n<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/483\/825\" aria-label=\"483 U. S. 825\">483 U.\u00a0S. 825<\/a>, and\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>City of Tigard<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/512\/374\" aria-label=\"512 U. S. 374\">512 U.\u00a0S. 374<\/a>, required the County to make an individualized determination that the fee imposed on him was necessary to offset traffic congestion attributable to his project. The courts below ruled against Sheetz based on their view that\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0apply only to permit conditions imposed on an ad\u00a0hoc basis by administrators, not to a fee like this one imposed on a class of property owners by Board-enacted legislation. 84 Cal. App. 5th 394, 402, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, 312.<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-e jy-both\"><em>Held<\/em>:\u2002The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative land-use permit conditions. Pp. 4\u201311.<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-f jy-both\">\u2003(a)\u2002When the government wants to take private property for a public purpose, the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/constitution\/fifth_amendment\" aria-label=\"US Constitution fifth Amendment \">Fifth Amendment<\/a>\u2019s Takings Clause requires the government to provide the owner \u201cjust compensation.\u201d The Takings Clause saves individual property owners from bearing \u201cpublic burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a \u00a0whole.\u201d\u00a0<em>Armstrong<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>United States<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/364\/40\" aria-label=\"364 U. S. 40\">364 U.\u00a0S. 40<\/a>, 49. Even so, the States have substantial authority to regulate land use, see\u00a0<em>Village of Euclid<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>Ambler Realty Co<\/em>.,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/272\/365\" aria-label=\"272 U. S. 365\">272 U.\u00a0S. 365<\/a>, and a State law that merely restricts land use in a way \u201creasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose\u201d is not a taking unless it saps too much of the property\u2019s value or frustrates the owner\u2019s investment-backed expectations.\u00a0<em>Penn Central Transp. Co<\/em>. v.\u00a0<em>New York City<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/438\/104\" aria-label=\"438 U. S. 104\">438 U.\u00a0S. 104<\/a>, 123, 127. Similarly, when the government can deny a building permit to further a \u201clegitimate police-power purpose,\u201d it can also place conditions on the permit that serve the same end.\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>, 483 U.\u00a0S., at 836. For example, if a proposed development will \u201csubstantially increase traffic congestion,\u201d the government may condition the building permit on the owner\u2019s willingness \u201cto deed over the land needed to widen a public road.\u201d\u00a0<em>Koontz<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>St. Johns River Water Management Dist<\/em>.,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/570\/595\" aria-label=\"570 U. S. 595\">570 U.\u00a0S. 595<\/a>, 605. But when the government withholds or conditions a building permit for reasons unrelated to its legitimate land-use interests, those actions amount to extortion. See\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>, 483 U.\u00a0S., at 837.<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-f jy-both\">\u2003The Court\u2019s decisions in\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0address the potential abuse of the permitting process by setting out a two-part test modeled on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See\u00a0<em>Perry<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>Sindermann<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/408\/593\" aria-label=\"408 U. S. 593\">408 U.\u00a0S. 593<\/a>, 597. First, permit conditions must have an \u201cessential nexus\u201d to the government\u2019s land-use interest, ensuring that the government is acting to further its stated purpose, not leveraging its permitting monopoly to exact private property without paying for it. See\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>, 483 U.\u00a0S., at 837, 841. Second, permit conditions must have \u201crough proportionality\u201d to the development\u2019s impact on the land-use interest and may not require a landowner to give up (or pay) more than is necessary to mitigate harms resulting from new development. See\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>, 512 U.\u00a0S., at 391, 393;\u00a0<em>Koontz<\/em>, 570 U.\u00a0S., at 612\u2013615. Pp. 4\u20136.<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-f jy-both\">\u2003(b)\u2002The County\u2019s traffic impact fee was upheld below based on the view that the\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0test does not apply to monetary fees imposed by a legislature, but nothing in constitutional text, history, or precedent supports exempting legislatures from ordinary takings rules. The Constitution provides \u201cno textual justification for saying that the existence or the scope of a State\u2019s power to expropriate private property without just compensation varies according to the branch of government effecting the expropriation.\u201d\u00a0<em>Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc<\/em>. v.\u00a0<em>Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/560\/702\" aria-label=\"560 U. S. 702\">560 U.\u00a0S. 702<\/a>, 714 (plurality opinion). Historical practice similarly shows that legislation was the conventional way that governments at the state and national levels exercised their eminent domain power to obtain land for various governmental purposes, and to provide compensation to dispossessed landowners. The\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/constitution\/fifth_amendment\" aria-label=\"US Constitution fifth Amendment \">Fifth Amendment<\/a>\u00a0enshrined this long \u00a0standing practice. Precedent points the same way as text and history. A legislative exception to the\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0test \u201cconflicts with the rest of [the Court\u2019s] takings jurisprudence,\u201d which does not otherwise distinguish between legislation and other official acts.\u00a0<em>Knick<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>Township of Scott<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/588\/180\" aria-label=\"588 U. S. 180\">588 U.\u00a0S. 180<\/a>, 185. That is true of precedents involving physical takings, regulatory takings, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine which underlies the\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0test. Pp. 7\u201310.<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-f jy-both\">\u2003(c)\u2002As the parties now agree, conditions on building permits are not exempt from scrutiny under\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0just because a legislative body imposed them. Whether a permit condition imposed on a class of properties must be tailored with the same degree of specificity as a permit condition that targets a particular development is an issue for the state courts to consider in the first instance, as are issues concerning whether the parties\u2019 other arguments are preserved and how those arguments bear on Sheetz\u2019s legal challenge. Pp. 10\u201311.<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-g jy-both\">84 Cal. App. 5th 394, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, vacated and remanded.<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-h jy-both\"><span class=\"smallcaps\">\u2003Barrett<\/span>, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.\u00a0<span class=\"smallcaps\">Sotomayor<\/span>, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which\u00a0<span class=\"smallcaps\">Jackson<\/span>, J., joined.\u00a0<span class=\"smallcaps\">Gorsuch<\/span>, J., filed a concurring opinion.\u00a0<span class=\"smallcaps\">Kavanaugh, J.,<\/span>\u00a0filed a concurring opinion, in which\u00a0<span class=\"smallcaps\">Kagan\u00a0<\/span>and<span class=\"smallcaps\">\u00a0Jackson<\/span>, JJ., joined.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"opinion\">\n<hr \/>\n<p><a id=\"writing-22-1074_OPINION_4\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#writing-ZS\" aria-label=\"Top\"><strong>TOP<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<h2>Opinion<\/h2>\n<div class=\"bodytext\">\n<p class=\"noticeopinions jy-both\">NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.\u00a0C. 20543, pio@supremecourt.gov, of any typographical or other formal errors.<\/p>\n<p class=\"scusnameplate jy-center\">SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/p>\n<p class=\"rule jy-center\">_________________<\/p>\n<p class=\"casenumber jy-center\">No. 22\u20131074<\/p>\n<p class=\"rule jy-center\">_________________<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-a jy-center\">GEORGE SHEETZ, PETITIONER\u00a0<em>v.<\/em>\u00a0COUNTY OF \u00a0EL DORADO, CALIFORNIA<\/p>\n<h4 class=\"sylct-b sc-1 jy-center\">on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of california, third appellate district<\/h4>\n<hr \/>\n<div class=\"opiniondates\">[April 12, 2024]<\/div>\n<hr \/>\n<p class=\"normal jy-both\">\n<p class=\"casct-a jy-both\"><span class=\"smallcaps\">\u2003Justice Barrett<\/span>\u00a0delivered the opinion of the Court.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003George Sheetz wanted to build a small, prefabricated home on his residential parcel of land. To obtain a permit, though, he had to pay a substantial fee to mitigate local traffic congestion. Relying on this Court\u2019s decisions in\u00a0<em>Nollan\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>California Coastal Comm\u2019n<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/483\/825\" aria-label=\"483 U.S. 825\">483 U.\u00a0S. 825 (1987)<\/a>,<em>\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0<em>Dolan\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>City of Tigard<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/512\/374\" aria-label=\"512 U.S. 374\">512 U.\u00a0S. 374 (1994)<\/a>, Sheetz challenged the fee as an unlawful \u201cexaction\u201d of money under the Takings Clause. The California Court of Appeal rejected that argument because the traffic impact fee was imposed by legislation, and, according to the court,\u00a0<em>Nollan\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0apply only to permit conditions imposed on an ad\u00a0hoc basis by administrators. That is incorrect. The Takings Clause does not distinguish between legislative and administrative permit conditions.<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"jy-center\">I<\/h3>\n<h4 class=\"jy-center\">A<\/h4>\n<p class=\"casct-d jy-both\">\u2003El Dorado County, California is a rural jurisdiction that lies east of Sacramento and extends to the Nevada border. Much of the County\u2019s 1,700 square miles is backcountry. It \u00a0is home to the Sierra Nevada mountain range and the Eldorado National Forest. Those areas, composed mainly of public lands, are sparsely populated. Visitors from around the world use the natural areas for fishing, backpacking, and other recreational activities.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003Most of the County\u2019s residents are concentrated in the west and east regions. In the west, the towns of El Dorado Hills, Cameron Park, and Shingle Springs form the outer reaches of Sacramento\u2019s suburbs. Placerville, the county seat, lies just beyond them. In the east, residents live along the south shores of Lake Tahoe. Highway 50 connects these population centers and divides the County into north and south portions.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003In recent decades, the County has experienced significant population growth, and with it an increase in new development. To account for the new demand on public services, the County\u2019s Board of Supervisors adopted a planning document, which it calls the General Plan, to address issues ranging from wastewater collection to land-use restrictions.<a id=\"OPINION_4-1ref\" class=\"footref\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#OPINION_4-1\" aria-label=\"reference 1 of Barrett Opinion\"><sup><strong>1<\/strong><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0The Board of Supervisors is a legislative body under state law, and the adoption of its General Plan is a legislative act. See Cal. Govt. Code Ann. \u00a765300\u00a0<em>et\u00a0seq.\u00a0<\/em>(West 2024).<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003To address traffic congestion, the General Plan requires developers to pay a traffic impact fee as a condition of receiving a building permit. The County uses proceeds from these fees to fund improvements to its road system. The fee amount is determined by a rate schedule, which takes into account the type of development (commercial, residential, and so on) and its location within the County. The amount is not based on \u201cthe cost specifically attributable to the particular project on which the fee is imposed.\u201d 84 Cal. App. 5th 394, 402, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d 308, 312 (2022).<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"jy-center\">\u00a0B<\/h3>\n<p class=\"casct-d jy-both\">\u2003George Sheetz owns property in the center of the County near Highway 50, which the General Plan classifies as \u201cLow Density Residential.\u201d\u00a0<a id=\"OPINION_4-2ref\" class=\"footref\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#OPINION_4-2\" aria-label=\"reference 2 of Barrett Opinion\"><sup><strong>2<\/strong><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0Sheetz and his wife applied for a permit to build a modest prefabricated house on the parcel, with plans to raise their grandson there. As a condition of receiving the permit, the County required Sheetz to pay a traffic impact fee of $23,420, as dictated by the General Plan\u2019s rate schedule. Sheetz paid the fee under protest and obtained the permit. The County did not respond to his request for a refund.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003Sheetz sought relief in state court. He claimed, among other things, that conditioning the building permit on the payment of a traffic impact fee constituted an unlawful \u201cexaction\u201d of money in violation of the Takings Clause. In Sheetz\u2019s view, our decisions in\u00a0<em>Nollan\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>California Coastal Comm\u2019n<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/483\/825\" aria-label=\"483 U. S. 825\">483 U.\u00a0S. 825<\/a>,<em>\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0<em>Dolan\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>City of Tigard<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/512\/374\" aria-label=\"512 U. S. 374\">512 U.\u00a0S. 374<\/a>, required the County to make an individualized determination that the fee amount was necessary to offset traffic congestion attributable to his specific development. The County\u2019s predetermined fee schedule, Sheetz argued, failed to meet that requirement.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003The trial court rejected Sheetz\u2019s claim and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. Relying on precedent from the California Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal asserted that the\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan\u00a0<\/em>test applies only to permit conditions imposed \u201c\u00a0\u2018on an individual and discretionary basis.\u2019\u00a0\u201d 84 Cal. App. 5th, at 406, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 316 (quoting\u00a0<em>San Remo Hotel L. P.\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>City and Cty. of San Francisco<\/em>, 27 Cal. 4th 643, 666\u2013670, 41 P.\u00a03d 87, 102\u2013105 (2002)). Fees imposed on \u201ca broad class of property owners through legislative action,\u201d it said, need not satisfy that test. 84 Cal. App. \u00a05th, at 407, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 316. The California Supreme Court denied review.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003State courts have reached different conclusions on the question whether the Takings Clause recognizes a distinction between legislative and administrative conditions on land-use permits.<a id=\"OPINION_4-3ref\" class=\"footref\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#OPINION_4-3\" aria-label=\"reference 3 of Barrett Opinion\"><sup><strong>3<\/strong><\/sup><\/a>\u00a0We granted certiorari to resolve the split. 600 U.\u00a0S. ___ (2023).<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"jy-center\">II<\/h3>\n<h4 class=\"jy-center\">A<\/h4>\n<p class=\"casct-d jy-both\">\u2003When the government wants to take private property to build roads, courthouses, or other public projects, it must compensate the owner at fair market value. The just compensation requirement comes from the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/constitution\/fifth_amendment\" aria-label=\"US Constitution fifth Amendment \">Fifth Amendment<\/a>\u2019s Takings Clause, which provides: \u201cnor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.\u201d By requiring the government to pay for what it takes, the Takings Clause saves individual property owners from bearing \u201cpublic burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.\u201d\u00a0<em>Armstrong\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>United States<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/364\/40\" aria-label=\"364 U. S. 40\">364 U.\u00a0S. 40<\/a>, 49 (1960).<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003The Takings Clause\u2019s right to just compensation coexists with the States\u2019 police power to engage in land-use planning. (Though at times the two seem more like in-laws than soulmates.) While States have substantial authority to regulate land use, see\u00a0<em>Village of Euclid\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Amber Realty Co.<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/272\/365\" aria-label=\"272 U.S. 365\">272 U.\u00a0S. 365 (1926)<\/a>, the right to compensation is triggered if they \u201cphysically appropriat[e]\u201d property or otherwise in\u00a0terfere with the owner\u2019s right to exclude others from it,\u00a0<em>Cedar Point Nursery\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Hassid<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/594\/139\" aria-label=\"594 U. S. 139\">594 U.\u00a0S. 139<\/a>, 149\u2013152 (2021). That sort of intrusion on property rights is a\u00a0<em>per\u00a0se\u00a0<\/em>taking.\u00a0<em>Loretto\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/458\/419\" aria-label=\"458 U. S. 419\">458 U.\u00a0S. 419<\/a>, 426 (1982). Different rules apply to State laws that merely restrict how land is used. A use restriction that is \u201creasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial government purpose\u201d is not a taking unless it saps too much of the property\u2019s value or frustrates the owner\u2019s investment-backed expectations.\u00a0<em>Penn Central Transp. Co.<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>New York City<\/em>,<em>\u00a0<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/438\/104\" aria-label=\"438 U. S. 104\">438 U.\u00a0S. 104<\/a>, 123, 127 (1978); see also\u00a0<em>Lucas\u00a0<\/em>v.<em>\u00a0South Carolina Coastal Council<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/505\/1003\" aria-label=\"505 U. S. 1003\">505 U.\u00a0S. 1003<\/a>, 1016 (1992) (\u201c[T]he\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/constitution\/fifth_amendment\" aria-label=\"US Constitution fifth Amendment \">Fifth Amendment<\/a>\u00a0is violated when land-use regulation does not substantially advance legitimate state interests\u00a0<em>or denies an owner economically viable use of his land<\/em>\u201d (internal quotation marks omitted)).<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003Permit conditions are more complicated. If the government can deny a building permit to further a \u201clegitimate police-power purpose,\u201d then it can also place conditions on the permit that serve the same end.\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>, 483 U.\u00a0S., at 836. Such conditions do not entitle the landowner to compensation even if they require her to convey a portion of her property to the government.\u00a0<em>Ibid.<\/em>\u00a0Thus, if a proposed development will \u201csubstantially increase traffic congestion,\u201d the government may condition the building permit on the owner\u2019s willingness \u201cto deed over the land needed to widen a public road.\u201d\u00a0<em>Koontz\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>St. Johns River Water Management Dist.<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/570\/595\" aria-label=\"570 U. S. 595\">570 U.\u00a0S. 595<\/a>, 605 (2013).<em>\u00a0<\/em>We have described permit conditions of this nature as \u201ca hallmark of responsible land-use policy.\u201d\u00a0<em>Ibid.\u00a0<\/em>The government is entitled to put the landowner to the choice of accepting the bargain or abandoning the proposed development. See R. Epstein, Bargaining With the State 188 (1993).<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003The bargain takes on a different character when the government withholds or conditions a building permit for rea\u00a0sons unrelated to its land-use interests. Imagine that a local planning commission denies the owner of a vacant lot a building permit unless she allows the commission to host its annual holiday party in her backyard (in propertyspeak, granting it a limited-access easement). The landowner is \u201clikely to accede to the government\u2019s demand, no matter how unreasonable,\u201d so long as she values the building permit more.\u00a0<em>Koontz<\/em>, 570 U.\u00a0S., at 605. So too if the commission gives the landowner the option of bankrolling the party at a local pub instead of hosting it on her land. See<em>\u00a0id<\/em>., at 612\u2013615. Because such conditions lack a sufficient connection to a legitimate land-use interest, they amount to \u201can out-and-out plan of extortion.\u201d\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>, 483 U.\u00a0S., at 837 (internal quotation marks omitted).<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003Our decisions in\u00a0<em>Nollan\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0<em>Dolan\u00a0<\/em>address this potential abuse of the permitting process. There, we set out a two-part test modeled on the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. See\u00a0<em>Perry\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Sindermann<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/408\/593\" aria-label=\"408 U. S. 593\">408 U.\u00a0S. 593<\/a>, 597 (1972) (government \u201cmay not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests\u201d). First, permit conditions must have an \u201cessential nexus\u201d to the government\u2019s land-use interest.\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>, 483 U.\u00a0S., at 837. The nexus requirement ensures that the government is acting to further its stated purpose, not leveraging its permitting monopoly to exact private property without paying for it. See\u00a0<em>id<\/em>., at 841. Second, permit conditions must have \u201c\u00a0\u2018rough proportionality\u2019\u00a0\u201d to the development\u2019s impact on the land-use interest.\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>, 512 U.\u00a0S., at 391. A permit condition that requires a landowner to give up more than is necessary to mitigate harms resulting from new development has the same potential for abuse as a condition that is unrelated to that purpose. See\u00a0<em>id<\/em>., at 393. This test applies regardless of whether the condition requires the landowner to relinquish property or requires her to pay a \u201cmonetary exactio[n]\u201d instead of relinquishing the property.\u00a0<em>Koontz,<\/em>\u00a0570 U.\u00a0S., at 612\u2013615.<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"jy-center\">\u00a0B<\/h3>\n<p class=\"casct-d jy-both\">\u2003The California Court of Appeal declined to assess the County\u2019s traffic impact fee for an essential nexus and rough proportionality based on its view that the\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan\u00a0<\/em>test does not apply to \u201clegislatively prescribed monetary fees.\u201d 84 Cal. App. 5th, at 407, 300 Cal. Rptr. 3d, at 316 (internal quotation marks omitted). That was error. Nothing in constitutional text, history, or precedent supports exempting legislatures from ordinary takings rules.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003The Constitution\u2019s text does not limit the Takings Clause to a particular branch of government. The Clause itself, which speaks in the passive voice, \u201cfocuses on (and prohibits) a certain \u2018act\u2019: the taking of private property without just compensation.\u201d\u00a0<em>Knight\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Metropolitan Govt. of Nashville &amp; Davidson Cty.<\/em>, 67 F. 4th 816, 829 (CA6 2023). It does not single out legislative acts for special treatment. Nor does the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/constitution\/amendmentxiv\" aria-label=\"US Constitution Amendment xiv\">Fourteenth Amendment<\/a>, which incorporates the Takings Clause against the States. On the contrary, the Amendment constrains the power of each \u201cState\u201d as an undivided whole. \u00a71. Thus, there is \u201cno textual justification for saying that the existence or the scope of a State\u2019s power to expropriate private property without just compensation varies according to the branch of government effecting the expropriation.\u201d\u00a0<em>Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc.\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/560\/702\" aria-label=\"560 U. S. 702\">560 U.\u00a0S. 702<\/a>, 714 (2010) (plurality opinion). Just as the Takings Clause \u201cprotects \u2018private property\u2019 without any distinction between different types,\u201d\u00a0<em>Horne\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Department of Agriculture<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/576\/351\" aria-label=\"576 U. S. 351\">576 U.\u00a0S. 351<\/a>, 358 (2015), it constrains the government without any distinction between legislation and other official acts. So far as the Constitution\u2019s text is concerned, permit conditions imposed by the legislature and other branches stand on equal footing.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003The same goes for history. In fact, special deference for legislative takings would have made little sense historically, because legislation was the conventional way that \u00a0governments exercised their eminent domain power. Before the founding, colonial governments passed statutes to secure land for courthouses, prisons, and other public buildings. See,\u00a0<em>e<\/em>.<em>g<\/em>., 4 Statutes at Large of South Carolina 319 (T. Cooper ed. 1838) (Act of 1770) (Cooper); 6 Statutes at Large, Laws of Virginia 283 (W. Hening ed. 1819) (Act of 1752) (Hening). These statutes \u201cinvariably required the award of compensation to the owners when land was taken.\u201d J. Ely, \u201cThat Due Satisfaction May Be Made:\u201d the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/constitution\/fifth_amendment\" aria-label=\"US Constitution fifth Amendment \">Fifth Amendment<\/a>\u00a0and the Origins of the Compensation Principle, 36 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 5 (1992). Colonial practice thus echoed English law, which vested Parliament alone with the eminent domain power and required that property owners receive \u201cfull indemnification .\u00a0.\u00a0. for a reasonable price.\u201d 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 139 (1768).<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003During and after the Revolution, governments continued to exercise their eminent domain power through legislation. States passed statutes to obtain private land for their new capitals and provided compensation to the landowners. See,\u00a0<em>e<\/em>.<em>g<\/em>., 4 Cooper 751\u2013752 (Act of 1786); 10 Hening 85\u201387 (1822 ed.) (Act of 1779). At the national level, Congress passed legislation to settle the Northwest Territory, which likewise required the payment of compensation to dispossessed property owners. Northwest Ordinance of 1789,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/rio\/citation\/1_Stat._52\">1 Stat. 52<\/a>. Two years later, the\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/constitution\/fifth_amendment\" aria-label=\"US Constitution fifth Amendment \">Fifth Amendment<\/a>\u00a0enshrined this longstanding practice. Against this background, it is little surprise that early constitutional theorists understood the Takings Clause to bind the legislature specifically. See,\u00a0<em>e.g.<\/em>, 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States \u00a71784, p. 661 (1833); 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 275\u2013276 (1827). Far from supporting a deferential view, history shows that legislation was a prime target for scrutiny under the Takings Clause.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003Precedent points the same way as text and history. A \u00a0legislative exception to the\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0test \u201cconflicts with the rest of our takings jurisprudence,\u201d which does not otherwise distinguish between legislation and other official acts.\u00a0<em>Knick\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Township of Scott,\u00a0<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/588\/180\" aria-label=\"588 U. S. 180\">588 U.\u00a0S. 180<\/a>, 185 (2019). That is true of physical takings, regulatory takings, and the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in which the\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0test is rooted.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003Start with our physical takings cases. We have applied the\u00a0<em>per\u00a0se<\/em>\u00a0rule requiring just compensation to both legislation and administrative action. In\u00a0<em>Loretto<\/em>, we held that a state statute effected a taking because it authorized cable companies to install equipment on private property without the owner\u2019s consent. 458 U.\u00a0S., at 438. In\u00a0<em>Horne<\/em>, we held that an administrative order effected a taking because it required farmers to give the Federal Government a portion of their crop to stabilize market prices. 576 U.\u00a0S., at 361. The branch of government that authorized the appropriation did not matter to the analysis in either case. Nor should it have. As we have explained: \u201cThe essential question is not .\u00a0.\u00a0. whether the government action at issue comes garbed as a regulation (or statute, or ordinance, or miscellaneous decree). It is whether the government has physically taken property for itself or someone else.\u201d\u00a0<em>Cedar Point<\/em>, 594 U.\u00a0S., at 149.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003This principle is evident in our regulatory takings cases too. We have examined land-use restrictions imposed by both legislatures and administrative agencies to determine whether the restriction amounted to a taking. In\u00a0<em>Pennsylvania Coal Co.\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Mahon<\/em>, we held a state statute effected a taking because it prohibited the owner of mineral rights from mining coal beneath the surface estate, thus depriving the mineral rights of practically all economic value.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/260\/393\" aria-label=\"260 U. S. 393\">260 U.\u00a0S. 393<\/a>, 414 (1922). And in\u00a0<em>Palazzolo<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>Rhode Island<\/em>, we remanded for the lower courts to determine whether an agency decision effected a taking when it denied the owner permission to build a beach club on the wetland portion of \u00a0his property but allowed him to build a home on the upland portion.\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/533\/606\" aria-label=\"533 U. S. 606\">533 U.\u00a0S. 606<\/a>, 631 (2001). Here again, our decisions did not suggest that the outcome turned on which branch of government imposed the restrictions.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003Excusing legislation from the\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan\u00a0<\/em>test would also conflict with precedent applying the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in other contexts. We have applied that doctrine to scrutinize legislation that placed conditions on the right to free speech,\u00a0<em>Agency for Int\u2019l Development\u00a0<\/em>v.<em>\u00a0Alliance for Open Society Int\u2019l, Inc.<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/570\/205\" aria-label=\"570 U.S. 205\">570 U.\u00a0S. 205 (2013)<\/a>, free exercise of religion,\u00a0<em>Sherbert\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Verner<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/374\/398\" aria-label=\"374 U.S. 398\">374 U.\u00a0S. 398 (1963)<\/a>, and access to federal courts,\u00a0<em>Terral\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Burke Constr. Co.<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/257\/529\" aria-label=\"257 U.S. 529\">257 U.\u00a0S. 529 (1922)<\/a>, among others,\u00a0<em>e<\/em>.<em>g<\/em>.,\u00a0<em>Memorial Hospital\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Maricopa County<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/415\/250\" aria-label=\"415 U.S. 250\">415 U.\u00a0S. 250 (1974)<\/a>\u00a0(right to travel). Failing to give like treatment to legislative conditions on building permits would thus \u201crelegat[e the just compensation requirement] to the status of a poor relation\u201d to other constitutional rights.\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>, 512 U.\u00a0S., at 392.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003In sum, there is no basis for affording property rights less protection in the hands of legislators than administrators. The Takings Clause applies equally to both\u2014which means that it prohibits legislatures and agencies alike from imposing unconstitutional conditions on land-use permits.<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"jy-center\">III<\/h3>\n<p class=\"casct-d jy-both\">\u2003The County no longer contends otherwise. In fact, at oral argument, the parties expressed \u201cradical agreement\u201d that conditions on building permits are not exempt from scrutiny under\u00a0<em>Nollan\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0just because a legislature imposed them. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4, 73\u201374. The County was wise to distance itself from the rule applied by the California Court of Appeal, because, as we have explained, a legislative exception to the ordinary takings rules finds no support in constitutional text, history, or precedent.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003We do not address the parties\u2019 other disputes over the validity of the traffic impact fee, including whether a permit \u00a0condition imposed on a class of properties must be tailored with the same degree of specificity as a permit condition that targets a particular development. The California Court of Appeal did not consider this point\u2014or any of the parties\u2019 other nuanced arguments\u2014because it proceeded from the erroneous premise that legislative permit conditions are categorically exempt from the requirements of\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>. Whether the parties\u2019 other arguments are preserved and how they bear on Sheetz\u2019s legal challenge are for the state courts to consider in the first instance.<\/p>\n<h3 class=\"jy-center\">*\u2003\u2003*\u2003\u2003*<\/h3>\n<p class=\"casct-d jy-both\">\u2003The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.<\/p>\n<p class=\"flushrgtpara jy-right\">It is so ordered.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<hr \/>\n<h3 class=\"fnheader\">Notes<\/h3>\n<p id=\"OPINION_4-1\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"fnflag\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#OPINION_4-1ref\" aria-label=\"back to text of Barrett Opinion at reference 1\">1<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0See County of El Dorado Adopted General Plan, https:\/\/edcgov.us\/\u00a0Government\/planning\/Pages\/adopted_general_plan.aspx.<\/p>\n<p id=\"OPINION_4-2\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"fnflag\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#OPINION_4-2ref\" aria-label=\"back to text of Barrett Opinion at reference 2\">2<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0See Figure LU\u20131: Land Use Diagram, https:\/\/edcgov.us\/government\/ planning\/adoptedgeneralplan\/figures\/documents\/LU-1.pdf.<\/p>\n<p id=\"OPINION_4-3\" class=\"footnote\"><a class=\"fnflag\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#OPINION_4-3ref\" aria-label=\"back to text of Barrett Opinion at reference 3\">3<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0Compare,\u00a0<em>e<\/em>.<em>g<\/em>.,\u00a0<em>Home Builders Assn. of Dayton and Miami Valley\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Beavercreek<\/em>, 89 Ohio St. 3d 121, 128, 729 N.\u00a0E. 2d 349, 356 (2000);\u00a0<em>Northern Ill. Home Builders Assn.\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>County of Du Page<\/em>, 165 Ill. 2d 25, 32\u201333, 649 N.\u00a0E. 2d 384, 389 (1995) (applying the\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0test to legislative permit conditions), with,\u00a0<em>e<\/em>.<em>g<\/em>.,\u00a0<em>St. Clair Cty. Home Builders Assn.\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Pell City<\/em>, 61 So. 3d 992, 1007 (Ala. 2010);\u00a0<em>Home Builders Assn. of Central Ariz.\u00a0<\/em>v.\u00a0<em>Scottsdale<\/em>, 187 Ariz. 479, 486, 930 P.\u00a02d 993, 1000 (1997) (following California\u2019s approach).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"concurrence\">\n<hr \/>\n<p><a id=\"writing-22-1074_CONCUR_5\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#writing-ZS\" aria-label=\"Top\"><strong>TOP<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<h2>Concurrence<\/h2>\n<div class=\"bodytext\">\n<p class=\"scusnameplate jy-center\">SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/p>\n<p class=\"rule jy-center\">_________________<\/p>\n<p class=\"casenumber jy-center\">No. 22\u20131074<\/p>\n<p class=\"rule jy-center\">_________________<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-a jy-center\">GEORGE SHEETZ, PETITIONER\u00a0<em>v.<\/em>\u00a0COUNTY OF \u00a0EL DORADO, CALIFORNIA<\/p>\n<h4 class=\"sylct-b sc-1 jy-center\">on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of california, third appellate district<\/h4>\n<hr \/>\n<div class=\"opiniondates\">[April 12, 2024]<\/div>\n<hr \/>\n<p class=\"normal jy-both\">\n<p class=\"casct-a jy-both\"><span class=\"smallcaps\">\u2003Justice Sotomayor<\/span>, with whom\u00a0<span class=\"smallcaps\">Justice Jackson\u00a0<\/span>joins<span class=\"smallcaps\">,\u00a0<\/span>concurring.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003I join the Court\u2019s resolution of the limited question presented in this case, that conditions on building permits are \u201cnot exempt from scrutiny under\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0just because a legislature imposed them.\u201d\u00a0<em>Ante<\/em>, at 10; see\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>California Coastal Comm\u2019n<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/483\/825\" aria-label=\"483 U.S. 825\">483 U.\u00a0S. 825 (1987)<\/a>;\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>City of Tigard<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/512\/374\" aria-label=\"512 U.S. 374\">512 U.\u00a0S. 374 (1994)<\/a>. There is, however, an important threshold question to any application of\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan\u00a0<\/em>scrutiny: whether the permit condition would be a compensable taking if imposed outside the permitting context.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\"><em>\u2003<\/em>\u201cA predicate for any unconstitutional conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into doing.\u201d\u00a0<em>Koontz<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>St. Johns River Water Management Dist.<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/570\/595\" aria-label=\"570 U. S. 595\">570 U.\u00a0S. 595<\/a>, 612 (2013). In the takings context,\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0scrutiny therefore applies only when the condition at issue would have been a compensable taking if imposed outside the permitting process. See\u00a0<em>Koontz<\/em>,<em>\u00a0<\/em>570 U.\u00a0S., at 612<em>\u00a0<\/em>(\u201c[W]e began our analysis in both\u00a0<em>Nollan\u00a0<\/em>and\u00a0<em>Dolan\u00a0<\/em>by observing that if the government had directly seized the easements it sought to obtain through the permitting process, it would have committed a\u00a0<em>per\u00a0se<\/em>\u00a0taking\u201d).<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u00a0\u2003The question presented in this case did not include that antecedent question: whether the traffic impact fee would be a compensable taking if imposed outside the permitting context and therefore could trigger\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\/<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0scrutiny. The California Court of Appeal did not consider that question and the Court does not resolve it. See\u00a0<em>ante,<\/em>\u00a0at 10\u201311. With this understanding, I join the Court\u2019s opinion.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"concurrence\">\n<hr \/>\n<p><a id=\"writing-22-1074_CONCUR_6\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#writing-ZS\" aria-label=\"Top\"><strong>TOP<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<h2>Concurrence<\/h2>\n<div class=\"bodytext\">\n<p class=\"scusnameplate jy-center\">SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/p>\n<p class=\"rule jy-center\">_________________<\/p>\n<p class=\"casenumber jy-center\">No. 22\u20131074<\/p>\n<p class=\"rule jy-center\">_________________<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-a jy-center\">GEORGE SHEETZ, PETITIONER\u00a0<em>v.<\/em>\u00a0COUNTY OF \u00a0EL DORADO, CALIFORNIA<\/p>\n<h4 class=\"sylct-b sc-1 jy-center\">on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of california, third appellate district<\/h4>\n<hr \/>\n<div class=\"opiniondates\">[April 12, 2024]<\/div>\n<hr \/>\n<p class=\"normal jy-both\">\n<p class=\"casct-a jy-both\"><span class=\"smallcaps\">\u2003Justice Gorsuch<\/span>, concurring.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003George Sheetz sued El Dorado County, alleging that the county\u2019s actions violated the Takings Clause under the test this Court set forth in\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>California Coastal Comm\u2019n<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/483\/825\" aria-label=\"483 U.S. 825\">483 U.\u00a0S. 825 (1987)<\/a>, and\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>City of Tigard<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/512\/374\" aria-label=\"512 U.S. 374\">512 U.\u00a0S. 374 (1994)<\/a>. State courts dismissed Mr. Sheetz\u2019s suit, holding that the\u00a0<em>Nollan\/Dolan<\/em>\u00a0test applies only in challenges to administrative, not legislative, actions. Today, the county essentially confesses error, and the Court corrects the state courts\u2019 mistake. It does so because our Constitution deals in substance, not form. However the government chooses to act, whether by way of regulation \u201c\u00a0\u2018or statute, or ordinance, or miscellaneous decree,\u2019\u00a0\u201d it must follow the same constitutional rules.\u00a0<em>Ante,<\/em>\u00a0at 9 (quoting\u00a0<em>Cedar Point Nursery<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>Hassid<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/594\/139\" aria-label=\"594 U. S. 139\">594 U.\u00a0S. 139<\/a>, 149 (2021)).<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003The Court notes but does not address a separate question: whether the\u00a0<em>Nollan\/Dolan\u00a0<\/em>test operates differently when an alleged taking affects a \u201cclass of properties\u201d rather than \u201ca particular development.\u201d\u00a0<em>Ante,<\/em>\u00a0at 11. But how could it? To assess whether a government has engaged in a taking by imposing a condition on the development of land, the\u00a0<em>Nollan\/Dolan<\/em>\u00a0test asks whether the condition in question bears an \u201c\u00a0\u2018essential nexus\u2019\u00a0\u201d to the government\u2019s land-use interest and has \u201c\u00a0\u2018rough proportionality\u2019\u00a0\u201d to a property\u2019s impact on that interest.\u00a0<em>Ante,<\/em>\u00a0at 6. Nothing about that test \u00a0depends on whether the government imposes the challenged condition on a large class of properties or a single tract or something in between. Once more, how the government acts may vary but the Constitution\u2019s standard for assessing those actions does not.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003Our precedents confirm as much. In\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>, the California Coastal Commission told the plaintiffs that they could build a home on their land only if they accepted an easement allowing public access across their property along the beach. The plaintiffs argued that the commission\u2019s demand amounted to a taking without just compensation, and the Court agreed. In doing so, the Court acknowledged that the commission hadn\u2019t singled out the plaintiffs\u2019 particular property for special treatment but \u201chad similarly conditioned\u201d dozens of other building projects. 483 U.\u00a0S., at 829. It acknowledged, too, that the commission\u2019s demand of the plaintiffs came about only because of a \u201c\u00a0\u2018comprehensive program\u2019\u00a0\u201d demanding similar public access easements up and down the California coast.\u00a0<em>Id.,<\/em>\u00a0at 841. But none of that made any difference in the Court\u2019s analysis, the test it applied, or the conclusion it reached. All that mattered was whether the government\u2019s action amounted to an uncompensated taking of the property of the plaintiffs whose case was actually before the Court.\u00a0<em>Id.,<\/em>\u00a0at 838.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\"><em>\u2003<\/em>In\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>, the Court faced a similar situation and reached a similar conclusion. There, an Oregon municipality conditioned a building permit on the plaintiff\u00a0\u2019s agreement to dedicate part of her land to \u201cflood control and traffic improvements.\u201d 512 U.\u00a0S., at 377. No one suggested that the city had targeted the plaintiff\u00a0\u2019s development for special treatment; everyone agreed that the city\u2019s challenged action was the result of a \u201ccomprehensive land use pla[n],\u201d one developed to meet \u201cstatewide planning goals.\u201d\u00a0<em>Ibid.\u00a0<\/em>Even so, the Court held an \u201cindividualized determination\u201d necessary to determine whether an unconstitutional taking had occurred under the same test the Court applied in\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>. \u00a0512 U.\u00a0S., at 393.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003The logic of today\u2019s decision is entirely consistent with these conclusions. The Takings Clause, the Court stresses, is no \u201c\u00a0\u2018poor relation\u2019 to other constitutional rights.\u201d\u00a0<em>Ante,<\/em>\u00a0at 10 (quoting\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>, 512 U.\u00a0S., at 392). And the government rarely mitigates a constitutional problem by multiplying it. A governmentally imposed condition on the freedom of speech, the right to assemble, or the right to confront one\u2019s accuser, for example, is no more permissible when enforced against a large \u201cclass\u201d of persons than it is when enforced against a \u201cparticular\u201d group. If takings claims must receive \u201clike treatment,\u201d\u00a0<em>ante,<\/em>\u00a0at 10, whether the government owes just compensation for taking your property cannot depend on whether it has taken your neighbors\u2019 property too.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003In short, nothing in\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>,\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>, or today\u2019s decision supports distinguishing between government actions against the many and the few any more than it supports distinguishing between legislative and administrative actions. In all these settings, the same constitutional rules apply. With that understanding, I am pleased to join the Court\u2019s opinion.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"concurrence\">\n<hr \/>\n<p><a id=\"writing-22-1074_CONCUR_7\" href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/22-1074#writing-ZS\" aria-label=\"Top\"><strong>TOP<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<h2>Concurrence<\/h2>\n<div class=\"bodytext\">\n<p class=\"scusnameplate jy-center\">SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES<\/p>\n<p class=\"rule jy-center\">_________________<\/p>\n<p class=\"casenumber jy-center\">No. 22\u20131074<\/p>\n<p class=\"rule jy-center\">_________________<\/p>\n<p class=\"sylct-a jy-center\">GEORGE SHEETZ, PETITIONER\u00a0<em>v.<\/em>\u00a0COUNTY OF \u00a0EL DORADO, CALIFORNIA<\/p>\n<h4 class=\"sylct-b sc-1 jy-center\">on writ of certiorari to the court of appeal of california, third appellate district<\/h4>\n<hr \/>\n<div class=\"opiniondates\">[April 12, 2024]<\/div>\n<hr \/>\n<p class=\"normal jy-both\">\n<p class=\"casct-a jy-both\"><span class=\"smallcaps\">\u2003Justice Kavanaugh<\/span>, with whom\u00a0<span class=\"smallcaps\">Justice Kagan<\/span>\u00a0and\u00a0<span class=\"smallcaps\">Justice Jackson<\/span>\u00a0join, concurring.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">\u2003I join the Court\u2019s opinion. I write separately to underscore that the Court has not previously decided\u2014and today explicitly declines to decide\u2014whether \u201ca permit condition imposed on a class of properties must be tailored with the same degree of specificity as a permit condition that targets a particular development.\u201d\u00a0<em>Ante<\/em>, at 10\u201311. Importantly, therefore, today\u2019s decision does not address or prohibit the common government practice of imposing permit conditions, such as impact fees, on new developments through reasonable formulas or schedules that assess the impact of classes of development rather than the impact of specific parcels of property. Moreover, as is apparent from the fact that today\u2019s decision expressly leaves the question open, no prior decision of this Court has addressed or prohibited that longstanding government practice.<\/p>\n<p class=\"casct jy-both\">Both\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\u00a0and\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0considered permit conditions tailored to specific parcels of property. See\u00a0<em>Dolan<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>City of Tigard<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/512\/374\" aria-label=\"512 U. S. 374\">512 U. S. 374<\/a>, 379\u2013381, 393 (1994);\u00a0<em>Nollan<\/em>\u00a0v.\u00a0<em>California Coastal Comm\u2019n<\/em>,\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/www.law.cornell.edu\/supremecourt\/text\/483\/825\" aria-label=\"483 U. S. 825\">483 U. S. 825<\/a>, 828\u2013829 (1987). Those decisions had no occasion to address permit conditions, such as impact fees, that are imposed on permit applicants based on reasonable formulas or schedules that assess the impact of classes of development.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Landmark Victory for Property Rights: Supreme Court Strikes Down Exorbitant Permit Fees<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4829,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":{"source_name":"Pacific Legal Foundation","source_url":"https:\/\/pacificlegal.org\/case\/sheetz-permit-extortion-scotus\/","via_name":"","via_url":"","override_template":"0","override":[{"template":"7","single_blog_custom":"","parallax":"1","fullscreen":"0","layout":"no-sidebar-narrow","sidebar":"default-sidebar","second_sidebar":"default-sidebar","sticky_sidebar":"1","share_position":"float","share_float_style":"share-normal","show_share_counter":"1","show_view_counter":"1","show_featured":"1","show_post_meta":"1","show_post_author":"1","show_post_author_image":"1","show_post_date":"1","post_date_format":"default","post_date_format_custom":"Y\/m\/d","show_post_category":"1","show_post_reading_time":"0","post_reading_time_wpm":"300","show_zoom_button":"0","zoom_button_out_step":"2","zoom_button_in_step":"3","show_post_tag":"1","show_prev_next_post":"0","show_popup_post":"1","number_popup_post":"1","show_author_box":"1","show_post_related":"1","show_inline_post_related":"1"}],"override_image_size":"0","image_override":[{"single_post_thumbnail_size":"crop-500","single_post_gallery_size":"crop-500"}],"trending_post":"0","trending_post_position":"meta","trending_post_label":"Trending","sponsored_post":"0","sponsored_post_label":"Sponsored by","sponsored_post_name":"","sponsored_post_url":"","sponsored_post_logo_enable":"0","sponsored_post_logo":"","sponsored_post_desc":"","disable_ad":"0"},"jnews_primary_category":{"id":"","hide":""},"jnews_social_meta":{"fb_title":"","fb_description":"","fb_image":"","twitter_title":"","twitter_description":"","twitter_image":""},"jnews_override_counter":{"override_view_counter":"0","view_counter_number":"0","override_share_counter":"0","share_counter_number":"0","override_like_counter":"0","like_counter_number":"0","override_dislike_counter":"0","dislike_counter_number":"0"},"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4828","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-government"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Sheetz v. El Dorado County: Closing the Loophole on Governmental Overreach - Placerville NewsWire<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"http:\/\/inedc.com\/24\/government\/sheetz-v-el-dorado-county-closing-the-loophole-on-governmental-overreach\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Sheetz v. El Dorado County: Closing the Loophole on Governmental Overreach - Placerville NewsWire\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Landmark Victory for Property Rights: Supreme Court Strikes Down Exorbitant Permit Fees\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"http:\/\/inedc.com\/24\/government\/sheetz-v-el-dorado-county-closing-the-loophole-on-governmental-overreach\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Placerville NewsWire\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/groups\/EDCnewswire\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:author\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/groups\/EDCnewswire\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2024-04-14T03:42:17+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"http:\/\/inedc.com\/24\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/ScreenHunter-4987.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"1581\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"685\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Cris Alarcon\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@https:\/\/twitter.com\/inedccom\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@inedccom\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Cris Alarcon\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"28 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"http:\\\/\\\/inedc.com\\\/24\\\/government\\\/sheetz-v-el-dorado-county-closing-the-loophole-on-governmental-overreach\\\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"http:\\\/\\\/inedc.com\\\/24\\\/government\\\/sheetz-v-el-dorado-county-closing-the-loophole-on-governmental-overreach\\\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Cris Alarcon\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/inedc.com\\\/24\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/6fe000a08266795285f981ef371f05f2\"},\"headline\":\"Sheetz v. 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