PLACERVILLE, Calif. \u2014 A public records request seeking details about El Dorado County\u2019s Flock Safety surveillance system has produced contract documents, partially redacted audit reports and a significant unanswered question: How much can residents learn about who accesses the vehicle data collected across their county?<\/p>\n
The response from the El Dorado County Sheriff\u2019s Office addresses several portions of a request submitted Aug. 24, 2026, seeking information about the county\u2019s automated license plate reader system. But the agency declined to release camera locations, limited the production of records showing outside-agency searches and did not directly establish whether federal agencies have accessed the county\u2019s data.<\/p>\n
The documents add to a public discussion about the costs, privacy implications and oversight of automated license plate readers, which capture vehicle license plates and allow law enforcement to search for vehicles associated with investigations.<\/p>\n
According to the response letter, the Sheriff\u2019s Office uploaded several records to its GovQA public records portal, including the Flock Safety contract, an agency data-sharing list, internal audit records and network-sharing information.<\/p>\n
The agency cited California Government Code Section 7922.000 to withhold a map or list of camera locations, stating that \u201cthe public interest in not disclosing outweighs the public interest in disclosing.\u201d<\/p>\n
That provision allows a public agency to withhold a record when it demonstrates that the public interest in nondisclosure clearly outweighs the interest in disclosure. The exemption is based on a balancing test; the citation alone does not resolve whether withholding a particular record is legally justified. California Government Code Section 7922.000<\/a>.<\/p>\n The Sheriff\u2019s Office also redacted portions of the audit records under Government Code Section 7923.600, which addresses certain law enforcement investigative and security records, and Section 7922.000. The response says the redactions include license plate information considered private third-party information.<\/p>\n The agency stated that its organization audit records begin in October 2025, when the office received access to the system, despite the request seeking records dating back to Aug. 24, 2025.<\/p>\n One of the most consequential parts of the request sought network audit records covering Aug. 24, 2025, through the date the request was processed.<\/p>\n The requester sought records showing searches conducted by outside agencies across the Flock network, including information that could help identify which agencies accessed the county\u2019s license plate data.<\/p>\n The Sheriff\u2019s Office said the reports could be generated only one month at a time, with each monthly report containing as many as 100,000 rows.<\/p>\n Citing the time and resources required to compile the records, the agency supplied a report covering Jan. 1-31, 2026, rather than the full requested period. That report was also redacted.<\/p>\n The limited production leaves a gap in the public record. A single month of network activity may help identify participating agencies, but it cannot establish the full scope of access over the requested period.<\/p>\n The county’s response says the January report should be sufficient to identify agencies accessing the license plate reader system. That assertion does not, by itself, establish which individual searches were conducted, why they were performed or whether each search complied with applicable policies.<\/p>\n The request specifically asked whether federal agencies, including U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and Homeland Security Investigations, had ever queried El Dorado County\u2019s data.<\/p>\n The response directed the requester to the uploaded Flock report and the list of agencies with which the county shares data.<\/p>\n That answer does not conclusively establish whether any of the named federal agencies have queried the county\u2019s data. A list of agencies with which the county shares information is not necessarily a complete record of every agency that has searched the system.<\/p>\n The distinction matters. Being connected to a data-sharing network, having permission to search data and actually conducting a search are three different things.<\/p>\n The released records would need to be examined to determine which agencies appear in the network audit, what the entries represent and whether the available logs document completed searches or other system activity.<\/p>\n The records described in the response also do not establish whether Flock\u2019s National Lookup or State Lookup features are enabled. The Sheriff\u2019s Office said it could view California law enforcement agencies that had agreed to share data with the county, as listed in the Flock report.<\/p>\n Without examining the underlying files and their field definitions, it would be premature to conclude that every California law enforcement agency \u2014 or college campus \u2014 can search El Dorado County\u2019s records.<\/p>\n The financial terms are more clearly documented in the county\u2019s public records.<\/p>\n On Aug. 26, 2025, the El Dorado County Board of Supervisors approved Purchase Contract 9757 with Flock Safety for $113,000. The contract provides for a two-year term with automatic renewals, subject to its terms, and authorizes certain additional spending and future amendments within applicable purchasing authority.<\/p>\n The agreement was approved through the board\u2019s consent agenda. The county identified California Multi-Jurisdictional Methamphetamine Enforcement Team special revenue funds as the funding source.<\/p>\n The contract\u2019s order form breaks the initial cost into $63,000 in first-year charges and $50,000 in annual recurring costs. The order form lists 12 devices: eight standard Flock license plate reader units, two solar long-range license plate readers and two solar video cameras.<\/p>\n The agreement also provides for automatic renewal unless either party gives notice of nonrenewal at least 30 days before the end of the applicable term.<\/p>\n These terms are documented in the Board of Supervisors\u2019 Aug. 26, 2025, agenda item and contract records<\/a>.<\/p>\n The contract\u2019s $113,000 initial total and $50,000 recurring annual charge are important figures for residents evaluating the system. The recurring charge also makes the renewal provisions relevant to future county spending decisions.<\/p>\n The county\u2019s approval documents say the system is intended to enhance investigations and crime prevention. The technology can help law enforcement identify vehicles of interest, locate missing persons and investigate reported crimes.<\/p>\n The public policy question is how those benefits should be balanced against privacy protections, data-sharing practices and the ability of residents to scrutinize the system.<\/p>\n The requester\u2019s account raises another question about control over camera placement.<\/p>\n According to the requester\u2019s interpretation of the contract, Flock Safety determines where cameras are placed, while the Sheriff\u2019s Office can suggest locations. The underlying contract and deployment provisions should be reviewed directly before drawing a definitive conclusion about the division of authority.<\/p>\n The county\u2019s original Board of Supervisors agenda item said cameras would be placed at strategic locations throughout the county to maximize investigative value and support crime prevention. It also described the potential use of Flock\u2019s existing agreements with property owners and other jurisdictions to expand coverage.<\/p>\n The agency\u2019s refusal to release a camera-location map means residents cannot use the response alone to determine where all county-associated cameras are installed.<\/p>\n That limitation makes other forms of oversight more important, including public access to deployment policies, the criteria used to select locations, the identities of participating agencies and documentation showing how the system is used.<\/p>\n The requester reported receiving spreadsheets containing names believed to belong to officers and records of internal and outside-agency audit activity.<\/p>\n Those records could be valuable, but their significance depends on what each field means and how the data was generated.<\/p>\n A careful review should distinguish among:<\/p>\n Internal searches: Activity by users within the Sheriff\u2019s Office.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n External searches: Activity by users from other agencies accessing the county\u2019s shared network data.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n Agency participation: Agencies listed as sharing data with or having a relationship to the county\u2019s network.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n Search justification: The stated reason for a particular query, where recorded and legally releasable.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n System access: An account or agency\u2019s ability to use a system, which does not necessarily prove that a specific search occurred.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n The request sought audit information covering a full year or more, but the response supplied only a limited portion of the network audit and redacted information from both categories of records.<\/p>\n The available records should therefore be treated as a starting point for further reporting, not as proof of widespread misuse or evidence that every recorded search was improper.<\/p>\n The next step is to turn the spreadsheets into a verifiable account of how the system operates.<\/p>\n First, the released files should be reviewed to identify the agencies listed in the January 2026 network audit and compare them with the agency-sharing list. The analysis should distinguish confirmed searches from other audit events and avoid treating an agency\u2019s presence on a sharing list as proof that it accessed specific records.<\/p>\n Second, the county should be asked to clarify whether the named federal agencies have ever queried its data, what records were searched to answer that question and whether the Sheriff\u2019s Office can provide a more direct response supported by available audit logs.<\/p>\n Third, the requester could seek the remaining monthly network audits in manageable batches, beginning with months that would answer the most important questions. The Sheriff\u2019s Office has explained why it did not provide the entire report at once, but the response does not establish that the remaining records can never be produced.<\/p>\n The requester could also ask the county to explain the specific basis for withholding camera locations and whether less sensitive records \u2014 such as general deployment criteria, camera counts by broad geographic area or non-sensitive location summaries \u2014 could be released without disclosing precise locations.<\/p>\n Finally, residents can review the original Board of Supervisors approval and contract<\/a> and the Sheriff\u2019s Office policy governing automated license plate readers. The department\u2019s published policy addresses authorized use, training, data handling and accountability. Read the Sheriff\u2019s Office policy manual<\/a>.<\/p>\n The central question is not simply whether license plate readers help solve crimes. It is whether residents can obtain enough reliable information to assess how the technology is used, how broadly data is shared and whether safeguards are working as intended.<\/p>\n The public records response has provided some of that information. It has not yet answered all of those questions.<\/p>\n Reporting note: This article is based on the public records response and the requester\u2019s description of the files received, supplemented by publicly available county contract and policy documents. The underlying GovQA spreadsheets were not provided with the material reviewed here, so no independent conclusions are drawn about individual officers\u2019 searches or specific federal agencies\u2019 access.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Who can search the data collected by El Dorado County\u2019s Flock cameras \u2014 and how much can the public learn about those searches? A new public records response provides some answers but leaves significant questions about camera locations, outside-agency access and oversight.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":14628,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"jnews-multi-image_gallery":[],"jnews_single_post":{"format":"standard","override":[{"template":"7","parallax":"1","layout":"no-sidebar-narrow","sidebar":"default-sidebar","second_sidebar":"default-sidebar","sticky_sidebar":"1","share_position":"float","share_float_style":"share-normal","show_share_counter":"1","show_view_counter":"1","show_featured":"1","show_post_meta":"1","show_post_author":"1","show_post_author_image":"1","show_post_date":"1","post_date_format":"default","post_date_format_custom":"Y\/m\/d","show_post_category":"1","post_reading_time_wpm":"300","post_calculate_word_method":"str_word_count","show_zoom_button":"0","zoom_button_out_step":"2","zoom_button_in_step":"3","show_post_tag":"1","show_popup_post":"1","show_comment_section":"1","number_popup_post":"1","show_author_box":"1","show_post_related":"1","show_inline_post_related":"1"}],"image_override":[{"single_post_thumbnail_size":"crop-500","single_post_gallery_size":"crop-500"}],"trending_post_position":"meta","trending_post_label":"Trending","sponsored_post_label":"Sponsored by","disable_ad":"0","subtitle":"Sheriff\u2019s Office withholds camera locations, releases partial audit records as questions grow over surveillance, data sharing and a $113,000 contract"},"jnews_primary_category":[],"jnews_social_meta":[],"jnews_override_counter":{"view_counter_number":"0","share_counter_number":"0","like_counter_number":"0","dislike_counter_number":"0"},"footnotes":""},"categories":[25,5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-14627","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-crime","category-government"],"yoast_head":"\nNetwork audit limited to one month<\/h3>\n
Does the data show federal agencies accessed local records?<\/h3>\n
The contract: $113,000, with recurring annual costs<\/h3>\n
Who decides where the cameras go?<\/h3>\n
What do the audit records actually establish?<\/h3>\n
\n
What happens next?<\/h3>\n